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I. INTRODUCTION
In early November 1995, management at CBS, on the advice of in-
house counsel, prohibited the news magazine show 60 Minutes from
broadcasting an interview with Dr. Jeffrey Wigand, a former vice-
president of the tobacco company Brown & Williamson.' The evening the
interview was to have been broadcast, correspondent Mike Wallace ex-
plained on air that CBS feared liability for inducing Wigand to breach a
confidentiality agreement that Wigand had signed upon departing the
company. Despite 60 Minutes's spotless legal record over twenty-seven
• 2
years of investigative reporting, lawyers for CBS worried that the network
might be liable for tortiously interfering with the contractual relationship
between Wigand and Brown & Williamson because it had extracted from
Wigand information protected by the confidentiality agreement.
Though the timidity shown by CBS seems misplaced,3 the fact that a
media institution as prominent and venerable as 60 Minutes chose to re-
frain from broadcasting an important interview because of fears of liability
for tortious interference means that this potential source of media liability
merits some examination. Indeed, the assumption that fear of liability for
activity on the boundaries of First Amendment protection would "chill"
speech at the core of those values seems to be one of the driving forces that
has historically led the Supreme Court to protect expression and activity
• • 4
that might be of dubious political value. The decision by CBS seems to be
the paradigmatic case for this concern: worried about potential liability for
1. Wigand is a biochemist and endocrinologist who was Vice-President of Research
and Development at Brown & Williamson until March 24, 1993. 215 N.Y. L.J. 26, 26
(1996). Wigand also spoke with officials of the Food and Drug Administration. 60 Minutes:
How He Won the War (CBS television broadcast, Dec. 8, 1996), available in 1996 WL
8065061 [hereinafter 60 Minutes].
2. Bill Carter, '60 Minutes' Explains why Show Backed off, ORANGE COUNTY REG.
(Cal.), Nov. 14, 1995, at F05.
3. According to Newsday, libel specialists apparently are unaware of a case in which a
media defendant has been held liable for speaking to a party to a nondisclosure agreement.
The Eye Blinks at '60 Minutes': Censorship of Tobacco Expose Harms Everyone,
NEWSDAY, Nov. 14, 1995, at B03. Some have speculated that it is not a coincidence that the
timidity displayed by CBS executives came at the same time that CBS shareholders were
preparing to vote on a $5.4 billion takeover of the company by Westinghouse Electric Corp.
See, e.g., Howard Kurtz, CBS Bows to Tobacco Clout, Cuts '60 Minutes' Segment,
BuFFALO NEWS, Nov. 10, 1995, at A13. Indeed, the president of CBS News and the com-
pany's general counsel stood to gain $1.46 and $1.19 million, respectively, through the
cashing out of stock options if the deal went through. Id.
4. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988); Philadelphia News-
papers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 772 (1986); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
342 (1974); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 148 (1967); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,433 (1963).
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a newsgathering technique of at least possibly questionable legality, CBS
decided not to broadcast a story of unquestionable public importance that
undoubtedly would have been protected speech had the source not been a
party to a nondisclosure agreement! If the courts were to impose liability
on and significant damages against the press for speaking with parties to a
nondisclosure agreement, potential wrongdoers that did not want their af-
fairs made public would have every incentive to require their employees or
agents to sign such agreements, and the press, fearing liability, may be
greatly handicapped in its role of gathering and reporting information of
6public significance.
Though implications for the press are general, for analytical pur-
poses, this Comment will use the CBS/Wigand affair as its model. Part II
briefly examines the historical grounding and elements of the cause of ac-
tion known as tortious interference with contract and discusses how the
interview with Dr. Wigand might be considered to have been tortious.7 Part
III analyzes the application of the tortious interference doctrine to nondis-
closure agreements and newsgathering in light of existing First Amend-
ment jurisprudence relating to libel and other causes of action. Part IV dis-
cusses the First Amendment right to petition under the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine and as applied in Sierra Club v. But? to tortious interference. Part
V then explores how the resulting standard might be applied to "Wigand
cases."'9 Part VI concludes that the press enjoys significant protection from
5. This assertion assumes, for the purpose of this Comment, that the story Wigand
told, and that CBS considered broadcasting, was substantially true, or at the very least, CBS
would not have been liable under the "actual malice" standard of New York Times, 376 U.S.
254, and that Brown & Williamson qualifies as a public figure under Curtis Publishing, 388
U.S. 130. In addition, see infra note 58 and accompanying text.
6. The Author assumes, for the purposes of this Comment, that newsgathering is con-
stitutionally protected activity under the First Amendment. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (declaring that the First Amendment prohibits
government from "limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may
draw"); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972); Sandra S. Baron et al., Tortious
Interference: The Limits of Common Law Liability for Newsgathering, 4 Wm. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1027, 1053-55 (1996).
7. The primary purpose of this Comment is to suggest how First Amendment princi-
ples might be applied to cases such as that involving 60 Minutes. For an excellent articula-
tion of common law defenses to a tortious interference claim in this context, see Baron et
al., supra note 6. For further discussion of common law defenses as well as some other First
Amendment analysis, see William Bennett Turner, News Media Liability for "Tortious In-
terference" with a Source's Nondisclosure Contract, 14 COMM. LAW. 13 (1996); Jane E.
Kirtley, Vanity and Vexation: Shifting the Focus to Media Conduct, 4 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. . 1069, 1101-09 (1996).
8. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
9. Attempts to hold the press liable for tortious interference for speaking to a party to
a nondisclosure agreement will hereinafter be referred to as "Wigand cases" or "Wigand
liability."
Number 2]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNVAL
Wigand liability under existing principles deriving from libel cases and
suggests that these principles support and are consistent with a proposed
standard of liability for Wigand cases based on the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine as applied in Butz.
II. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT
A. Overview
The basic formulation of the doctrine of tortious interference with
contract is that a party that intentionally and improperly interferes with the
performance of a contract between two other parties by inducing or
causing one party not to perform may be liable to the other party for its pe-
cuniary loss resulting from the nonperformance." At common law, liability
was originally based on conduct by the defendant that was itself tortiously
directed toward the third party or plaintiff, such as when the defendant
used violence or fraud to prevent the third party from performing." How-
ever, the decision in Lumley v. Gye13 is commonly seen as the starting
point of the development of the interference itself as a separate tort, even if
the defendant's conduct would not otherwise be tortious. In Lumley, the
defendant was a theater operator who induced a singer under contract to
sing at the plaintiff's theater to break her contract with the plaintiff and
sing for the defendant. The plaintiff did not allege that the defendant had
employed otherwise tortious conduct in persuading the singer to breach her
contract, but the court found for the plaintiff nevertheless. 4 Today, the tort
is most commonly alleged in this kind of commercial context, where one
competitor has induced a third party, such as a supplier or buyer, to breach
a contract with a rival firm or individual. 5
Imposing liability for interference based on conduct that is not inde-
pendently tortious is arguably justified on the grounds that the plaintiff is
injured by the third party's breach, regardless of the means by which the
defendant induced it. However, the plaintiff's right to compensation is
10. Hereinafter, the party potentially subject to liability will be referred to as the
"defendant," the allegedly injured party as the "plaintiff," and the other, nonperforming
party to the contract as the "third party."
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977).
12. Id. § 766 cmt. c.
13. Lumley, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App. 1987)
(reviewing a jury award totaling $10.53 billion on Pennzoil's tortious interference claim
against Texaco).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. c (1977). Note, however, that the
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not absolute. Rather, it must be balanced against the defendant's interest in
freedom of action and the social interest in allowing the defendant's con-
duct. 7 Thus, no liability for tortious interference should be imposed in a
Wigand case if the interests of the media and society in a free press are
found to outweigh a corporation's interest in enforcing a nondisclosure
agreement, and the media's conduct in inducing a Wigand source is not
otherwise improper.' 8
The validity of the contract at issue is not dispositive. The contract
must be in force at the time of the breach caused by the defendant and be
applicable to the particular performance that the third party has been in-
duced not to complete, but it is not required that the contract be legally en-
forceable against the third person.'9 The third party must have already
breached the contract and exercised his defense before the defendant may
"interfere" without risk of liability, even if the contract was not enforce-
able against the alleged third-party breacher in the first instance. In other
words, though Wigand might have had a First Amendment or other de-
fense to an action for breach of contract brought by Brown & William-
son,2 1 CBS still might have been exposed to liability for inducing him to
breach his nondisclosure agreement under common law doctrine.
B. Elements of Tortious Interference
In order to be liable for tortious interference, the defendant must have
induced the third party to breach his contract with the plaintiff. Inducement
operates on the mind of the third party and can consist of mere persua-
sion.2 Furthermore, the defendant must have knowledge of the existence
plaintiff may not collect damages for the breach from both the defendant and the third
party. Id. § 774A(2). Thus, it would seem that an action for breach of contract against the
third party would be easier to maintain and sufficient to make the plaintiff whole in most
cases where the third party is not judgment proof. In those cases where the third party
breacher is judgment proof, tortious interference seems akin to the unjust enrichment doc-
trine in equity on the theory that the defendant should not be allowed to benefit from the
plaintiff's loss. If unjust enrichment concerns are in fact the underlying justification for tor-
tious interference liability where the defendant's conduct is not otherwise tortious, then
such liability seems particularly inappropriate in Wigand cases.
17. Id. § 766 cmt. c ("The issue is whether in the given circumstances [the defendant's]
interest and the social interest in allowing the freedom claimed by him are sufficient to out-
weigh the harm that his conduct is designed to produce. In deciding this issue, the nature of
his conduct is an important factor.").
18. See Baronet al., supra note 6, at 1041-51.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. f.
20. Id.
21. Wigand has been sued by Brown & Williamson, and CBS is paying his expenses in
the litigation. 60 Minutes, supra note 1.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. h.
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of the contract and that the conduct that he encourages the third party to
undertake will be in breach of the contract.2' As noted above, the defendant
may be held liable if he has knowledge of the contract, even if he believes
24that the contract is not legally binding. Finally, though ill will and malice
on the part of the defendant are not necessary elements of liability,2 the
defendant must have the intent and purpose of interfering with the con-
tract. This means that the defendant is liable if he acts "for the primary
purpose of interfering with the performance of the contract" or "knows that
the interference is certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of his
action., 26 However, the defendant is not liable if he is approached by the
third party and accepts an offer from the third party that he knows to be in-
consistent with the third party's performance of his contract with the
plaintiff.
21
Thus, in the Wigand case, if 60 Minutes approached Wigand, knew of
his nondisclosure agreement, and persuaded him to consent to an inter-
view, then CBS met the intent and purpose prong of the tort. After all, the
purpose of the nondisclosure agreement between Brown & Williamson and
Wigand was to prevent disclosure of precisely the type of information that
he revealed in the interview with Mike Wallace, and Wallace's purpose
was clearly to obtain and broadcast that information. CBS knew that Wi-
gand could not speak to Wallace and simultaneously perform his contract
21
with Brown & Williamson. On the other hand, if Wigand initially ap-
proached 60 Minutes and offered to tell his story, CBS might not have
been liable even if it knew of the nondisclosure agreement.29 Nevertheless,
23. Id. § 766 cmt. i.
24. Id.
25. Id. § 766 cmts. r-s.
26. Id. § 766 cmt. j. Note, however, that the incidental nature of the defendant's inter-
ference should be taken into account in evaluating the propriety thereof. Id; see also infra
notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. n.
28. Technically, CBS interfered with the contract between Brown & Williamson and
Wigand solely by virtue of Wallace conducting the interview with Wigand, for it was by
participating in that interview and revealing information about Brown & Williamson's in-
ternal matters that Wigand breached his nondisclosure agreement. Thus, the decision not to
broadcast the interview did not absolve CBS of liability for speaking to Wigand. However,
broadcasting the interview might have substantially increased the damages that Brown &
Williamson could collect, thereby significantly strengthening Brown & Williamson's in-
centive to sue and the threat to CBS's viability should it lose the suit. But see infra notes
127-133 and accompanying text on the issue of damages.
29. Indeed, one author has written:
It is not clear that the program's involvement was the proximate cause of
[Wigand's] breach. The employee had become disenchanted with his employer's
business months before the interview and apparently was eager to speak to the
media. It is entirely possible that the employee would have breached in any case,
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this distinction is hardly satisfactory to preserve the information seeking
and gathering role of the press, for in effect it would shield the press from
liability only when it is the passive recipient of information.
A finding of liability on the part of the defendant is often based
largely on a determination as to the propriety or impropriety of his conduct
in interfering with the contract. Courts examine a variety of factors in
making this determination, including the nature of the defendant's conduct
and his motive, the interests of the plaintiff, the interests sought to be ad-
vanced by the defendant, the social interests in protecting the freedom of
action of the defendant, the contractual interests of the plaintiff, the prox-
imity or remoteness of the defendant's conduct to the interference, and the
relations between the parties."
In most Wigand cases, the plaintiff's interests in preserving the integ-
rity of its contractual relations, the defendant's interests in interfering with
those relations, and society's interest in protecting each party's interests
must be weighed against each other. This should result in the media
avoiding liability. This is especially true if the balance is conceived of as a
contest between the interest of the press and society in preserving the role
of the press in providing information to the public on matters of great pub-
lic concern versus the interest of a corporation and society in concealing
such information. Indeed, the invitation to find that the "conduct should be
permitted without liability, despite its effect of harm to another"' seems
expressly to allow a court to find that, as a matter of law, speaking to an
individual bound by a nondisclosure agreement in the course of legitimate
newsgathering is per se not improper interference. Moreover, the invitation
to examine the defendant's motive seems to favor a member of the press
seeking to inform the public, in contrast to a competitor of the plaintiff
seeking only to acquire trade secrets or damage Brown & Williamson in
order to improve its own business position.
32
The common law of tortious interference also recognizes that some
contractual interests should receive greater protection than others. The Re-
statement (Second) of Torts (Restatement) explicitly states:
[T]he fact that a contract violates public policy, as, for example, a
contract in unreasonable restraint of trade, or that its performance will
enable the party complaining of the interference to maintain a condi-
tion that shocks the public conscience... may justify an inducement
or indeed that he already had, and that '60 Minutes' was merely the conduit
through which the employee chose to make the breach public.
James C. Goodale, "60 Minutes" v. Vice Versa, 24 N.Y. L.J. 3, 4 (1995).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (a)-(g).
31. Id. § 767 cmt. b.
32. See id. § 767 cmt. d; see also Baron et al., supra note 6, at 1035-37; infra, Part V.
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of breach that, in the absence of this fact, would be improper.33
Thus, a court could find that performance of the nondisclosure agreement
between Wigand and Brown & Williamson would enable Brown & Wil-
liamson to "maintain a condition that shocks the public conscience" be-
cause respecting Brown & Williamson's contractual rights would allow it
to conceal information important to public health.34
In addition to recognizing that some contractual interests merit less
protection than others, the Restatement notes that "In some cases the
[defendant] may be seeking to promote not solely an interest of his own
but a public interest. The [defendant] may believe that certain practices
used in another's business are prejudicial to the public interest. '' 35 If the de-
fendant seeks to protect the public from such practices by preventing the
third party from performing a contract, the Restatement sets out several
questions to be asked in determining the propriety of the defendant's inter-
ference. These include whether the practices are actually being used by the
plaintiff, whether the defendant actually believes that the practices are• • •36
prejudicial to the public interest, whether his belief is reasonable, whether
he is acting in good faith for the protection of the public interest,37 whether
the contractual relation involved is incident or foreign to the continuation
of the practices, and whether the defendant employs wrongful means to
38accomplish the result.
33. Id. § 767 cmt. e; see also id § 774A.
34. Id. § 767 cmt. e. A court, in making such an "as applied" determination of the pro-
priety of the nondisclosure agreement would not need to find that such agreements are per
se violative of public policy, such as when they are used to prevent sources such as Wigand
from speaking with a competitor. Indeed, society's interest may weigh in on the side of pre-
venting a company from discovering the "internal affairs" of a competitor, especially if
such information might include, for example, the process for artificially elevating the nico-
tine level in cigarettes. See infra note 124.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. f; see also Baron et al., supra note 6,
at 1032-35.
36. These three questions are analogous to the standard for libel liability set out by the
Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 379 U.S. 254 (1964) and Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The question whether the practices are actually being used
parallels the libel defense of truth, and the questions about the defendant's beliefs shadow
the "actual malice" standard of New York Times. See infra text accompanying note 46.
37. This question is similar to the idea underlying the "sham" exception to the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine as set out in Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. f.
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C. Damages
A defendant liable to a plaintiff for interference with a contract may
be liable in damages for the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract,
consequential losses for which the interference is the legal cause, 4° and
emotional distress or actual harm to reputation reasonably expected to re-
sult from the interference. 4" The fact that the third party breacher is liable
for his or her breach of contract does not affect the amount of damages for
which the defendant-interferer may be held liable, but any damages paid
by the third party will reduce the defendant's liability correspondingly. 42
Moreover, because an action for interference with contract lies in tort,
damages are not based on contract rules. Thus, it is not necessary that loss
incurred by the plaintiff be "within the contemplation of the parties to the
contract itself at the time it was made." 43
As discussed in greater detail in Part IV, the availability of damages
for emotional distress and harm to reputation indicate that the interference
with contract tort, at minimum, should be subject to the same rigorous
standard of liability that the Supreme Court has applied to libel and other
torts involving speech.
III. WIGAND CASES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Libel Law
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 44the United States Supreme Court
constitutionalized much of the law of libel in this country. An Alabama
public official brought an action for libel against the New York Times for
publishing a paid adverstisement that allegedly contained some inaccura-
cies about events in Birmingham. The Court held that the First Amend-
ment, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, limits the
power of the states to impose liability for allegedly libelous speech. Spe-
cifically, the Court held that speech about a public official on a matter of
public concern cannot be the basis of liability for libel unless the plaintiff
shows by clear and convincing evidence that the assertions made by the
defendant are false and that the defendant acted with actual malice.45 As
39. Id. § 774A(1)(a).
40. Id. § 774A(1)(b).
41. Id. § 774A(1)(c).
42. Id. § 774A(2).
43. Id. § 774A cmt. d.
44. New York Times, 379 U.S. 254 (1964).
45. Id. at 279-80.
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used by the Court, "actual malice" does not mean common law malice--
that is, ill will-but rather that the defendant spoke with knowledge of the
falsity or reckless disregard for the truthfulness of its assertions.4
The New York Times case is relevant to Wigand cases in three sig-
nificant ways. First, the Court applied the reasoning of Shelley v. Krae-
merf that a civil action between two private parties can be considered to
be state action for the purposes of applying the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution. In New York Times, the Court wrote:
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama
courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to im-
pose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedom of speech and
press. It matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action and
that it is common law only, though supplemented by statute.
8
The Court's holding, that the action and judgment below in New York
Times constituted state action that restricted First Amendment freedoms,
means that at the threshold, potential plaintiffs such as Brown & William-
son in Wigand cases will not be able to avoid the application of First
Amendment principles to their cause of action merely because they are
private actors. The absence of a "private actor" bar to First Amendment
defenses does not mean, however, that the First Amendment automatically
applies. It remains to be seen if, and to what extent, First Amendment
principles will have force in tortious interference claims in Wigand cases.
The second manner in which the New York Times decision is relevant
to Wigand cases is the Court's enunciation of a strong statement of policy
underlying the First Amendment. The Court asserted that the purpose of
the First Amendment is to "secure 'the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources,"'' 49 and that the
Amendment was "'fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the peo-
ple."' 5 These statements about the importance of First Amendment free-
46. Id.
47. Shelley, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
48. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 265.
49. Id. at 266 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
50. Id. at 269 (emphasis added) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1957)). But see Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Jewish Community Relations Council of N.Y., Inc.,
968 F.2d 286, 296 (2d Cir. 1992). In Jewsfor Jesus, the defendants were sued for tortious
interference after they had threatened to boycott a country club that had a contract to pro-
vide accommodations to the plaintiff in order to force the club to breach its contract with
the plaintiff. Id. at 289. The Second Circuit held that the First Amendment was not a de-
fense to the action because New York's tortious interference law was directed at conduct
and not at speech. However, the court focused on the fact that the plaintiffs had sought to
coerce the club into violating state and federal antidiscrimination statutes, analogizing to
cases in which the defendants had picketed in order to force an employer to discriminate in
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doms culminated in the oft-quoted passage that the Court would consider
the case "against the background of a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open .... ,5 Finally, and perhaps most importantly for Wigand cases,
the Court reasoned that "[t]he protection of the public requires not merely
discussion, but information. 52
The third reason the New York Times decision is important for Wi-
gand cases is the actual malice standard itself. The truth of the information
supplied to 60 Minutes would not have been in issue in an action for tor-
tious interference. Nevertheless, as will be discussed in greater detail
hereinafter, the actual malice standard has been brought to bear on claims
such as intentional infliction of emotional distress that seem equally un-
likely candidates for its application.
The Court extended the application of the actual malice standard to
cases involving plaintiffs who are "public figures" but who are not public
officials in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts.53 In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
14Inc., a plurality of the Court employed New York Times to create a con-
stitutional standard based on the substantive nature of the speech at issue.
Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, stated:
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly
become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or be-
cause in some sense the individual did not "voluntarily" choose to be-
come involved. The public's primary interest is in the event; the public
focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect, and
significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or
notoriety.
55
The plurality concluded that "[d]rawing a distinction between 'public' and
'private' figures makes no sense in terms of the First Amendment guaran-
tees."56 This "public issue" standard did not survive long, however. Just
hiring, to prevent implementation of a school desegregation order, or to force an employer
to violate a state antirestraint of trade statute. Id. at 296. Moreover, the court was of the
opinion that the speech involved in Jews for Jesus was not political speech designed to se-
cure governmental action but a series of private communications in context of a private dis-
pute. Id. at 298. In contrast, most Wigand cases would not involve reporters trying to in-
duce sources to violate any law other than state tortious interference doctrine, and seeking
to uncover information on matters of public concern is closer to core First Amendment ac-
tivity than the "private dispute" in JewsforJesus.
51. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
52. Id. at 272 (citing Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1942)).
53. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
54. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
55. Id. at 43.
56. Id. at 45.
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three years later in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,57 the fractured Court of Ro-
senbloom coalesced into a majority that rejected that test in favor of a
public/private figure distinction. This debate over whether the appropriate
test should be the nature of the issue or the person discussed has only mar-
ginal relevance to most potential Wigand cases, because courts are likely
to find that corporations are public figures for the purposes of New York
Times and Gertz analyses."
B. New York Times in Nonlibel Contexts
The Supreme Court has extended the application of the New York
Times standard beyond claims of libel. In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,59
the Court considered a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress
brought by a prominent public figure who had been the subject of an ad
parody that depicted him discussing having had drunken incestuous rela-
tions with his mother. Finding that the plaintiff was a public figure for
First Amendment purposes and relying on a jury finding below that the
ad parody could not "'reasonably be understood as describing actual facts
about [respondent] or actual events in which [he] participated,''. the
Court held thai public officials and figures may not recover for the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publication without
showing that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was
made with "actual malice. 62 In other words, a public plaintiff must show
that the defendant made a false assertion, with knowledge that it was false,
or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true, in order to re-
ceive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the
57. Gertz, 418 U.S. 323 (1974). However, the public matter standard seems to have
been revived in some form. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749 (1985) (holding that libel plaintiff not required to meet New York Times's actual malice
standard in order to be awarded punitive damages when plaintiff is a private person and the
speech is on a subject of private concern); see also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S.
46, 48, 50 (1988).
58. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Johnson, 713 F.2d 262, 273 (7th
Cir. 1983); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947
(D.D.C. 1976); Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 489 (Minn.
1985) ("It is clear.., that in its decision in Gertz the [Supreme Court] was deeply respon-
sive to the need for protection of uniquely human interests not possessed by corporations.").
But see Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. at 757-58 (implying that an incorporated plaintiff is
properly characterized as a "private plaintiff'). Whether or not all corporations are general
purpose public figures, there can be little doubt that Brown & Williamson is a public figure
for the limited purpose of the debate about tobacco in this country.
59. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 46.
60. Id. at 57 (alteration in original) (quoting app. to Petition for Cert. at Cl).
61. Id. at49.
62. Id. at 56.
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defendant's publication or speech.
The Court rejected the plaintiffs contention that the speech was so
outrageous as to justify imposition of a lower standard of liability on the
defendant. 63 The plaintiff argued that the gravamen of the tort is the intent
to cause injury, and so as long as the defendant intended to cause injury
which did in fact inflict serious emotional distress, the truth or falsity of
the defendant's speech is of no constitutional relevance." Moreover, the
plaintiffs libel claim, and corresponding claim for reputational damages,
had been rejected by the courts below, but the same courts had awarded
plaintiff damages for emotional distress nevertheless. Citing Garrison v.
State of Louisiana,65 the Court reasoned that the motive or intent of the de-
fendant is irrelevant for First Amendment purposes. Thus, although the de-
fendant's speech was concededly false, and probably spoken with "actual
malice," the Court focused on the fact that the jury below found that the
parody could not reasonably have been believed as asserting the truth in
reversing the lower court's finding of damages. In a later decision, the
Court indicated that its holding in Hustler might have been based on the
belief that the plaintiff had not really suffered emotional damage as a re-
sult of the parody, but had claimed intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress in order to be awarded reputational damages--thus avoiding the New
York Times standard of liability."
The Court, however, declined to apply New York Times three years
later in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. 67 The plaintiff, Cohen, was involved in
a candidate's campaign in Minnesota's 1982 gubernatorial election when
he approached reporters from two major Twin Cities newspapers and of-
fered to provide them with information regarding a candidate in the up-
coming election. Cohen required the reporters to promise that his identity
would not be revealed as a condition of providing the information. The re-
porters so promised, and Cohen gave them public court records concerning
the Democratic-Farmer-Labor party's candidate for lieutenant governor.
When the two newspapers published their stories, both identified Cohen as
the source of the court records and indicated his connection to the Inde-
pendent-Republican campaign. Cohen was fired by his employer" the daythe stories ran.
63. Id. at 53.
64. Id.
65. Garrison, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (holding that even speakers motivated by hatred or ill
will are protected by the First Amendment from liability for civil or criminal libel).
66. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671 (1991).
67. Id.
68. Cohen had been employed by an advertising company. Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1990), rev'd, 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
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Though the plaintiff never raised a claim of promissory estoppel him-
self,69 the Minnesota Supreme Court raised the possibility of such a claim
sua sponte at oral arguments." In its opinion, the Minnesota court ad-
dressed the promissory estoppel question and noted that, in order to make
out a claim of promissory estoppel, the plaintiff would have to show that
injustice could be avoided only by enforcing the promise made by the re-
porters.71 The court then reasoned that the right to a free press must be con-
sidered in determining the injustice of not enforcing the promise, and, us-
ing a balancing analysis, held that enforcing the promise would violate the
72
newspapers' First Amendment rights.
On review of the promissory estoppel issue,73 the United States Su-
preme Court rejected the newspapers' contention that the case was con-
trolled by a line of cases holding that "'if a newspaper lawfully obtains
truthful information about a matter of public significance then state offi-
cials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent
a need to further a state interest of the highest order."'' 74 Instead, the Court
held that the case was controlled by an "equally well-established line of
decisions holding that generally applicable laws do not offend the First
Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has inci-
dental effects on its ability to gather and report the news." 5 As examples
of such generally applicable laws, the Court cited trespass, 76 the duty to re-
spond to grand jury subpoenas,77 copyright,78 the National Labor Relations79 •80 •81
Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, antitrust laws, and nondiscrimina-
69. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 666-67. The plaintiff sued the publishers of both newspapers,
but alleged only breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation. Id.
70. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 204 n.5.
71. Id. at 204.
72. Id. at 205.
73. The Court rejected the respondents' claim that review should be denied because the
state court had decided the case on the independent state law claims of breach of contract
and fraudulent misrepresentation by reasoning that the state supreme court had raised the
promissory estoppel issue itself-holding that if Cohen could recover at all, it would be on
promissory estoppel theory-and may have decided the case differently on that issue had it
applied the correct First Amendment analysis. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 667-68.
74. Id. at 668-69 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979));
see also Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Landmark Comm., Inc. v. Virginia,
435 U.S. 829 (1978). It is arguable that this line of cases would not control in a Wigand
case anyway because the claim of a plaintiff such as Brown & Williamson would be pre-
cisely that CBS had obtained the information "illegally."
75. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669.
76. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
77. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972).
78. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Brdcst. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576-79 (1977).
79. Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 130 (1937).
80. Oklahoma Press Publ'g. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1946).
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tory taxes. 2
As a doctrine generally applicable to the transactions of all the resi-
dents of Minnesota that did not single out the press, promissory estoppel
qualified as a law of general applicability." Though recognizing that
promissory estoppel is a state law doctrine that creates obligations never
explicitly assumed by the parties in a contract,4 the Court also reasoned
that the doctrine simply requires parties to adhere to legal obligations de-
fined and imposed by the parties themselves.85 Therefore, the Court de-
clined to apply New York Times heightened standard of liability to claims
of promissory estoppel. In distinguishing Hustler, the Court relied on the
fact that Cohen had not sought damages for injury to his reputation or
emotional well-being, but only for injury resulting from the loss of his job
and lowered earning capacity." Therefore, the Court reasoned, Cohen had
not attempted to circumvent the strict requirements for establishing a libel
or defamation claim as, impliedly, the plaintiff in Hustler had done. 7
C. New York Times, Hustler, Cohen, and Wigand
The Hustler and Cohen cases provide a useful framework for ana-
lyzing Wigand cases. Both concern liability for First Amendment activity,
though one case was based on tort and the other on quasi-contract princi-
ples. Tortious interference with contract claims involving newsgathering,
thereby combining tort, contract, and First Amendment principles, seem to
fall neatly in the intersection between these two cases.
If Wigand cases invite application of one of the analyses employed
by the Court in Hustler or Cohen, it is not immediately apparent which
case should be controlling. On one hand, Wigand cases involve a tort, as
did Hustler; on the other hand, the doctrine of tortious interference is a
81. Citizen Publ'g. Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969); Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19 (1945).
82. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
581-83 (1983); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943).
83. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991).
84. Id. at 668.
85. Id. at 671. The Court contrasted this with the situation in cases like Florida Star v.
B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) and Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103
(1979) by noting that in those cases the State itself defined the content of publications that
would trigger liability.
86. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 671. The Court did not address the question as to how Cohen's
earning capacity could have been lowered through means other than through damage to his
reputation. There was no allegation that Cohen had suffered any lasting physical or mental
impairment as the result of the newspapers' breach of promise. See also id. at 675 n.3
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 906(b) cmt. c.
87. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 671.
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"law of general applicability" just as is Minnesota's doctrine of promissory
estoppel. Scrutiny of the similarities and differences between Hustler and
Cohen with an eye toward Wigand cases might reveal the most helpful
analysis.
First, some words about Hustler. The Court's reasoning is curious,
for the injury alleged in an action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress is fundamentally different from that claimed in a libel action. An
intentional infliction plaintiff asserts that the defendant's conduct has
caused the plaintiff severe emotional distress, whereas a libel plaintiff
claims that his reputation has been harmed by the defendant's speech. In
other words, a libel plaintiff alleges that the defendant's speech had an ef-
fect on third parties such that the plaintiffs popular esteem was lowered,
thus causing him indirect injury. In contrast, an intentional infliction
plaintiff claims that the defendant's conduct or speech operated on him di-
rectly, not on third persons. The truth of the defendant's speech is not an
issue. Even if the plaintiff's reputation has not been damaged, as the jury
finding about the unbelievability of the parody in Hustler would seem to
have indicated, the plaintiff claims that he has sustained damage to his
own emotional well-being. For the Court's analysis to make sense," the
Court must have discerned some correspondence between the two torts
other than the nature of the injury alleged.
The key similarity might be the relatively speculative nature of the
damages involved in libel and intentional infliction. In Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., the Court was concerned about the arbitrary nature of pre-
sumed and punitive damages awarded to libel plaintiffs at common law,90
and in New York Times the Court also worried that newspapers may not be
88. This argument assumes that the Court did not engage in nullification of the jury's
findings as suggested by Justice White in his majority opinion in Cohen. Justice White im-
plied that the reason for the Court's equation of the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress with the tort of libel rested primarily on the Court's belief that the plaintiff
had alleged intentional infliction for what was really a libel claim in order to avoid the strict
requirements set out in New York Times. See id. at 671.
Whatever the plaintiff's motive in alleging intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, the jury explicitly rejected his libel claim but at the same time found that he met the
burden of proof on his intentional infliction claim (i.e. that defendant had intended to cause
severe emotional distress and had in fact done so). See Hustler, 485 U.S. 46, 48, 50 (1988).
Thus, the jury seems to have been able to distinguish between the two causes of action.
Neither the lower courts nor the Supreme Court in Hustler ever disputed that Falwell had
proven the common law elements of his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
89. The Court may have been influenced by the fact that Falwell alleged that publish-
ing the parody constituted both libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress. How-
ever, the fact that the jury was able to distinguish between the two torts, as discussed supra,
note 88, suggests that should not have been a source of confusion for the Court.
90. Gertz, 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974).
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able to survive a succession of such judgments.9' The Court was even more
concerned that "the pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those who
would give voice to public criticism is an atmosphere in which the First
Amendment freedoms cannot survive." 92 Similarly, the "state of mind"
damages at issue in intentional infliction of emotional distress claims such
as Hustler93 are inherently speculative. Requiring a jury or judge to fix
damages for injury to a plaintiff s state of mind is to ask them to assign a
dollar figure to an ephemeral and unknowable loss-a task certainly no
less difficult to perform than measuring an individual's loss of esteem in
the community. Indeed, the Court seems to have equated the two types of
damages in distinguishing Hustler in Cohen.94
In contrast, damage awards in promissory estoppel cases are rela-
tively more rationally calculated. Recovery under the doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel is based largely on the theory that the promise of the alleged
breacher induced the promisee to act or forebear acting to the promisee's
detriment.9' Thus, the promisee usually is permitted to recover only reli-
ance damages; that is, those damages incurred as a result of relying on the
promise, such as expenditures made in preparation for performance or in
performance." The party alleging breach of promise usually must show
definite losses incurred in reliance on the promise. Moreover, the remedy
granted for breach of promise may be limited as justice requires. 97
In Cohen, the Court distinguished Hustler by noting that Cohen had
sought only "damages... for breach of a promise that caused him to lose
his job and lowered his earning capacity." The Court's reliance on this
point of reasoning is significant in two ways. First, the fact that the Court
drew this distinction between the cases suggests that the Court viewed the
damages available to a plaintiff under a theory of promissory estoppel as
qualitatively different from those available in an action alleging libel or
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Second, it indicates that the dif-
ference in the nature of damages available was important in determining
the appropriate First Amendment analysis to be applied.
91. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 379 U.S. 254, 278 (1964).
92. Id.
93. The jury in Hustler awarded the plaintiff $100,000 in compensatory damages and
$50,000 in punitive damages from each of the three defendants. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 49.
94. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671 (1991).
95. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981); CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS §§ 8.1-8.13 (1996).
96. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349; cf. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS§ 8.8.
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1).
98. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 671.
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On the first point, this distinction is the only one drawn explicitly by
the Court between the "law of general applicability" at issue in Hustler-
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress-and the promissory
estoppel theory in Cohen. The Court must have seen a qualitative differ-
ence, but it seems that it did so based on an erroneous impression of the
damages awardable on a theory of promissory estoppel. The Court seems
to have believed that Cohen could have been awarded the damages he
sought for loss of his job and earning capacity rather than being limited to
pure reliance damages.99 However, even if all traditional contract remedies
are available to promissory estoppel plaintiffs, they likely would be subject
to the usual limitations such as avoidability,'O° forseeability,'0 ' and reason-
able certainty of amount.0 2 There is a more important distinction between
promissory estoppel, on one hand, and libel and intentional infliction of
emotional distress on the other: under contract law, there is a near total
proscription on damages for emotional disturbance'0 3 and punitive dam-
99. It appears as though the Minnesota courts limit recovery based on a claim of prom-
issory estoppel to reliance damages. See, e.g., Grouse v. Group Health Plan, 306 N.W.2d
114 (Minn. 1981) ("When a promise is enforced pursuant to section 90 '[t]he remedy
granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.' Relief may be limited to damages
measured by the promisee's reliance." (quoting RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90
(1932))(alteration in original); see also Gorham v. Benson Optical, 539 N.W.2d 798 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1995); Board v. Simmons Industries, No. C3-94-116, 1994 WL 454738, at *3
(Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 1994).
In fact, in Cohen itself, the Minnesota Supreme Court indicated that Minnesota
promissory estoppel doctrine tracks the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90. Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 204 n.5 (Minn. 1990), rev'd, 501 U.S. 663 (1991). In
addition, the United States Supreme Court seems to have overlooked or ignored the fact that
the Minnesota Supreme Court had raised the promissory estoppel issue sua sponte. Id. Co-
hen's complaint alleged only fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract. Thus the
damages he sought, and those that he was awarded by the jury, were not based on a theory
of promissory estoppel. However, it might be argued that Cohen put his job and reputation
at risk by agreeing to give the reporters the court records and thus "relied" on their promise
of confidentiality. However, those losses seem to be more akin to consequential damages as
opposed to pure reliance losses--as if Cohen had expended money in obtaining the infor-
mation for the reporters or had foregone an exclusive lucrative offer with no guarantee of
confidentiality from another newspaper. The key distinction between reliance and conse-
quential damages appears to be the contingency of the loss. If the loss would have been in-
curred by the injured party regardless of the other party's performance-for example, ex-
pended capital in performance or foregone opportunities--the loss can truly be said to have
been incurred in reliance. In contrast, if the loss is contingent on the breach of the other
party, such as Cohen's loss of his job and earning capacity, the loss is a consequential in-
jury. See generally CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 998, 1011.
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350. It is admittedly hard to imagine,
though not inconceivable, that Cohen could have avoided his losses in some manner.
101. Id. § 351.
102. Id. § 352.
103. Id. § 353 ("Recovery for emotional disturbance will be excluded unless the breach
also caused bodily harm or the contract or the breach is of such a kind that serious emo-
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ages, I" whereas emotional distress is an injury for which libel' and inten-
tional infliction"' plaintiffs may be compensated with punitive damages.
Indeed, the majority in Cohen specifically rejected a dissenter's charge
that awarding the plaintiff damages was "punitive" by noting that compen-
satory damages are not a form of punishment, whereas punitive damages
obviously are. This suggests that the majority considered the nature of
available damages to be an important factor in its analysis.10 7
If the nature of damages recoverable is a principal factor in the
Court's First Amendment analysis, tortious interference with contract is
much more analagous to libel and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress than it is to promissory estoppel. Tortious interference with contract
requires, obviously, the existence of a contract, even though the action it-
self lies in tort. A result of this unique combination of principles is that
damages recoverable by a tortious interference plaintiff encompass those
traditionally associated with both contract and tort. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts states that recoverable damages include compensation
for the gains the plaintiff expected to realize from the contractual rela-
tion,"' consequential losses, harm to reputation,'10 and emotional dis-
tress.I1 If the availability of damages for emotional distress or harm to
reputation is the key distinction between laws of general applicability, as
tional disturbance was a particularly likely result.").
104. Id. § 355 ("Punitive damages are not recoverable for a breach of contract unless the
conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable.").
In fact, Cohen had sought punitive damages, but only under a claim of fraudulent misrepre-
sentation (a tort) that was rejected by the Minnesota courts. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,
501 U.S. 663, 671 (1991).
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 622 cmt. d, 623 (1977); see also Curtis
Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 161 (1967) (public figure libel plaintiffs may be awarded
punitive damages if they prove actual malice); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
345 (1974) (holding that private libel plaintiffs need to prove actual malice in order to be
awarded punitive damages where speech concerns private matter only).
106. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 49 (1988) (discussing award of pu-
nitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
107. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670. Note, however, speaking on the distinction between com-
pensatory and punitive damages, that the Court went on to say, "[T]he characterization of
the payment makes no difference for First Amendment purposes when the law being ap-
plied is a general law and does not single out the press." Id. In light of this indication that
the Court seemed to discern no dispositive difference between the two types of damages
when a law of general applicability is at issue, the speculative nature of the compensatory
damages available may remain as the only real difference between promissory estoppel and
intentional infliction discussed by the Court.
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A(1)(a).
109. Id. § 774A(1)(b).
110. Id. § 774A(1)(c).
111. Id.
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the Court indicated in Cohen,112 then Wigand cases clearly fall under a
Hustler analysis. Of course, neither the truth nor falsity of the information
elicited by CBS from Wigand, nor CBS's knowledge or disregard thereof
would be an issue under the technical elements of a tortious interference
claim, but neither were such questions at issue under the intentional inflic-
tion claim in Hustler. This incongruity between the actual malice standard
of New York Times and the elements of the tort alleged did not impede the
Court's willingness in Hustler to apply New York Times without explaining
how it should be applied to future cases where the truth of the material is
not at issue.
Another difference between Cohen and Hustler is the emphasis in
Cohen on the notion that the parties had an agreement that created and de-
fined the legal duties they owed to each other,"' despite the Court's ac-
knowledgment that promissory estoppel is a doctrine that creates obliga-
tions never explicitly assumed by the parties."4 The Court's reliance on
notions of contract-like, bargained-for obligations suggests that the news-
papers waived their First Amendment rights in some manner by promising
confidentiality to Cohen. Though it is not clear that the requirements for
waiver were met,"5 First Amendment rights can be waived explicitly.",
This notion of waiver is crucial, for it suggests another principal dis-
tinction between the Court's decision in Cohen and actions in tort such as
in Hustler and Wigand cases. If the defendant newspapers in Cohen can be
said to have affirmatively and voluntarily assumed legal obligations by
"bargaining" with Cohen, the same cannot be said of the defendants in li-
bel, intentional infliction, or Wigand cases. Whereas promissory estoppel
is based, at least in part, on quasi-contract principles, tort doctrines such as
libel, intentional infliction, and tortious interference are pre-existing duties
imposed on the defendant regardless of the defendant's relationship to the
plaintiff. In the Wigand case, Dr. Wigand might have voluntarily assumed
legal obligations that restricted his First Amendment rights, but CBS was a
112. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 671. The Court never disputed the dissent's assertion that
promissory estoppel and intentional infliction are equally laws of general applicability. See
id. at 675 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As noted supra text accompanying note 66, and
notes 85-86, the only distinctions drawn between the two actions were the types of damages
recoverable, the argument that defendants in Cohen had waived their First Amendment
rights, and the Court's implied belief that the intentional infliction claim in Hustler was
merely a dodge from New York Times's strict requirements. See also infra note 129 and
accompanying text.
113. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 671.
114. Id. at 668.
115. See id. at 677 (Souter, J., dissenting).
116. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 145 (1967) (evidence of waiver must be "clear and compelling").
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party external to that agreement. As such, CBS never waived any First
Amendment rights nor voluntarily assumed any legal obligations to Brown
& Williamson. Rather, if liability were to be imposed on CBS for tortious
interference, such liability would be grounded solely on legal duties im-
posed upon CBS by the state. Thus, though both promissory estoppel and
tortious interference are "laws of general applicability," duties arising un-
der a theory of promissory estoppel arguably can be said to be self-
imposed whereas those arising under tortious interference doctrine clearly
are not.
A third useful distinction between tortious interference and the
promissory estoppel issue in Cohen is the effect the application of each
doctrine would have on the ability of the press to gather information. As
applied in Cohen, the promissory estoppel doctrine imposed costs on the
publication of information already gathered by the press, namely, the
identity of the source of court records. In contrast, liability in a Wigand
case would be based on speaking to a source who is a party to a nondisclo-
sure agreement. Liability is imposed at the point of information gathering
rather than at the point of publication of conditionally acquired informa-
tion. This distinction may have been what the Court meant when in Cohen
it reasoned that the promissory estoppel doctrine imposed only
"incidental" effects on the freedom of the press.17 One might argue that
upholding a "self-imposed" restriction on what the press can publish is
more "incidental" than upholding a ban on the press speaking to a source
and therefore possibly preventing them from gathering information alto-
gether.
As in most torts, the issue of liability for tortious interference is dis-
tinct from that of remedies available. In the absence of constitutional re-
strictions, CBS might have been liable for merely speaking to Wigand.
Damages available to Brown & Williamson might then have included
compensation for its expected gains from its contract with Wigand, its
losses incurred as a consequence of Wigand's breach, harm to Brown &
Williamson's reputation, and punitive damages."
As potentially crippling for the defendant as the damages available to
a tortious interference plaintiff may appear to be,"' closer scrutiny of the
117. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669.
118. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). In
Texaco, the jury awarded Pennzoil $7.53 billion in compensatory and $3 billion in punitive
damages from Texaco for interfering with an agreement between Pennzoil and Getty Oil
and other Getty entities to purchase stock in Getty Oil. Id. at 784. The Texas Court of Ap-
peals found the $3 billion punitive damage award to be excessive and reduced it to $1 bil-
lion. Id. at 866.
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damages issue in the context of a Wigand case illustrates that established
First Amendment principles limit the damages a plaintiff such as Brown &
Williamson might recover. First, a tortious interference plaintiff may re-
cover for the "pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract... ,2 In the
context of a nondisclosure agreement such as that signed by Wigand, it is
difficult to distinguish between such "expectation" damages and conse-
quential or reputation damages. Nondisclosure agreements typically do not
confer a benefit on the employer other than security against disclosure of
sensitive information. Such agreements are fundamentally a loss-
prevention device, not benefit- or profit-creating instruments. Thus, it
would be difficult to measure what a plaintiff such as Brown & William-
son expected to gain in monetary terms when entering the contract.
Second, consequential and reputational damages in this context seem
to be essentially the same thing.'2 Unless CBS were to use the material it
garners from Wigand to compete directly with Brown & Williamson, or
were to broadcast technical information that allows Brown & William-
son's competitors to gain market share, the greatest injuries to Brown &
Williamson are most likely to stem from harm to its reputation, such as
lost sales and business opportunities, lost goodwill, a decrease in the value
of its securities, and an increase in the cost of obtaining capital.'2 In other
words, a blow to Brown & Williamson's reputation because of Wigand's
revelation--for example, that the company artificially elevated nicotine
levels in its cigarettes in order to more efficiently addict its customers' 24-
probably would constitute the bulk, if not all, of the consequential losses
suffered by Brown & Williamson as a result of Wigand's breach. Realisti-
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A(1)(a) (1977).
121. A useful contrast might be drawn with noncompetition agreements. Typically, such
competition agreements require an employee or agent not to compete with his former em-
ployer for a given period of time and within a specified geographical area either by com-
peting directly on his own or working for a competing business. Binding a particularly
knowledgeable or skillful employee to a noncompetition contract could be said to confer a
competitive advantage on the employer, and breach of that contract would then defeat the
employer's expected gain from that advantage.
122. See also Baron et al., supra note 6, at 1060.
123. Food Lion claimed these injuries in its recent litigation with Capital Cities/ABC.
Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811, 823 n.3 (M.D.N.C. 1995).
The court did not decide which of these might constitute reputational damages. Id.
124. This is merely a speculative example of the kind of damaging information sources
like Wigand might reveal. However, 60 Minutes has reported evidence that suggests that
Brown & Williamson has genetically engineered, grown in Brazil, and imported to the
United States a breed of tobacco plant that produces twice the nicotine of naturally grown
plants. 60 Minutes, supra note 1. Apparently, there is also evidence that Brown & William-
son has used a chemical process akin to the "freebasing" technique used by illegal narcotic
users in order to increase the potency of the nicotine in its cigarettes, and that Philip Morris
has long known that nicotine shares some of the same properties as heroin and cocaine. Id.
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cally, because Wigand breached his agreement by speaking to 60 Minutes,
rather than Philip Morris (a competitor of Brown & Williamson), the only
substantial injuries incurred by Brown & Williamson would be the result
of damage to its reputation. 25
As discussed above,126 the availability of reputation damages seems
to be a crucial touchstone of First Amendment jurisprudence. If a plaintiff
may recover damage to its reputation, then the United States Supreme
Court has required that the plaintiff meet the requirements of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan in order to establish liability. Indeed, at least one
federal court has held that a plaintiff may collect damages for injury
caused by a media defendant's wrongful and illegal acts in collecting in-
formation, such as fraud and trespass, but such a plaintiff may not recover
reputational damages as a result of any broadcast of truthful information.
In Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 27 the district court wrote:
Food Lion does not allege that any of the alleged unlawfully obtained
and published information was false. Instead, Food Lion contends that
ABC's alleged wrongful actions in obtaining information about Food
Lion are sufficient to allow Food Lion to recover both reputational and
non-reputational damages regardless of whether the information pub-
lished by ABC was true or false.1
Addressing the issue of whether the Supreme Court's "laws of general ap-
plicability" reasoning in Cohen or the logic of Hustler was controlling, the
court went on to hold:
Where, however, a plaintiff seeks to use a generally applicable law to
recover for injury to reputation or state of mind while avoiding the re-
quirements of a defamation claim (requiring proof of falsity and actual
malice), the Cohen holding does not appear to be applicable. To the
extent that Food Lion is attempting to recover reputation damages
without establishing the requirements of a defamation claim, this case
more closely resembles Hustler.
29
125. This is not to say that injuries suffered by Brown & Williamson would be minimal.
In fact, they could be quite substantial. Damage done to Brown & Williamson's reputation
might well result in huge business losses, including lost market share, cancelled contracts
with suppliers or retailers, decreased stock prices resulting in shareholder litigation, inabil-
ity to hire or retain qualified employees, etc. Nevertheless, all of these losses would serve
only to contribute to the measure of reputation damages. They are not injuries independent
of the injury to the company's reputation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 561.
126. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
127. FoodLion, 887 F. Supp. at 811.
128. Id. at 822.
129. Id. at 823. The court noted that Food Lion had alleged damages such as lost sales,
business opportunities and goodwill, a decrease in the value of its securities, and an increase
in the cost of obtaining funds, but the court did not decide which of these, if any, consti-
tuted reputational damages. Id. at 823 n.3. However, a jury subsequently awarded Food
Lion over $5.5 million on its fraud claim. Food Lion had sought damages in excess of $52
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Following this court's reasoning, it seems that, unless plaintiffs in Wigand
cases can meet the New York Times requirements, they should be able to
recover only nonreputational damages, which would be nominal in most
cases.
However, the actual malice test of New York Times does not fit well
in the context of a Wigand case for the same reason it is not easily applied
to intentional infliction of emotional distress; that is, the truth or falsity of
the material disclosed is not in issue. By application of the actual malice
test to the intentional infliction tort, however, the court may have meant to
indicate that publication or disclosure of truthful information can never be
the basis of liability unless the defendant voluntarily agreed to restrictions
on its First Amendment rights. 3 Indeed, the Court's imposition in Hustler
of a requirement of a false statement of fact in intentional infliction cases
brought by public figures.' is consistent with the Court's statement years
earlier in Garrison v. State of Louisiana that "[tlruth may not be the sub-
ject of either civil or criminal sanctions where discussion of public affairs
is concerned.' 32 If this statement has force in the context of a Wigand
case, then damages available to a plaintiff such as Brown & Williamson
should be limited to those stemming directly from Wigand's breach-his
interview with Mike Wallace. Publication of any truthful information
gained by Wallace from Wigand could not be the basis for damages under
a tortious interference claim.
IV. THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE
As previously noted, the analogy of tortious interference cases to the
reasoning of Hustler, both explicit and implicit, leads to the conclusion
that the "law of general applicability" test of Cohen and its corresponding
low level of scrutiny should be rejected for Wigand cases. Having rejected
Cohen's teaching, it remains to be seen what test should be applied. Hus-
tler seems to say that the "actual malice" standard of New York Times must
be met, but, as in Hustler itself, the verity of the defendant's speech would
not be at issue in a Wigand case. The Court acknowledged as much in
Hustler, and its perfunctory, if not blind, application of New York Times to
Reverend Falwell's intentional infliction claim leaves us with little guid-
ance both as to how Hustler is to be followed in the future and as to the
breadth of New York Times requirements outside the context of libel
million. See Andrew B. Sims, Food Lion and the Media's Liability for Newsgathering
Torts: A Symposium Preview, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA& ENT. L.J. 389 (1997).
130. See supra notes 74 & 85.
131. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,56 (1988).
132. Garrison, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
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claims.
Because the most fundamental difficulty with applying New York
Times to nonlibel claims is the absence of the truth issue, a test that does
not depend on the truth or falsity of the information in controversy might
be more useful than a New York Times test in Wigand cases. One such test
might be what is commonly referred to as the Noerr-Pennington' doc-
trine, as enunciated in Sierra Club v. Butz.
34
In Butz, the Sierra Club and other plaintiffs brought an action seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief against a lumber company and others that
would have had the effect of temporarily prohibiting logging in an area of
Northern California. The lumber company counterclaimed by alleging tor-
tious interference with an advantageous relationship."' It contended that
the plaintiffs had "interfered" by making oral and written representations,
asserting administrative appeals, and filing complaints in order to persuade
the federal government that the area should be preserved. The federal dis-
trict court held that this type of activity could not be the basis of liability
under state law because of the First Amendment guarantee of the right to
petition the government for redress of grievances."'
The court framed the case as a right to petition issue, but noted that
the right to petition the government "is a basic freedom in a participatory
government, closely related to freedom of speech and press; together these
are the 'indispensable democratic freedoms' that cannot be abridged if a
government is to continue to reflect the desires of the people."' 37 Though
the rights to a free press and to petition the government are distinct rights,
they are generally subject to the same constitutional analysis.' The Noerr-
Pennington line of cases relied on by the district court concerned applica-
tion of federal antitrust statutes in light of the right to petition. The court
reasoned that those cases together with New York Times "outlined the ap-
plicable principles of law"'1 controlling its decision in Butz. Apparently,
then, the court believed that New York Times Co. v. Sullivan was relevant
in that it stood for the principle that First Amendment rights in general are
133. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern 1-R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
134. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
135. The basic elements of tortious interference with an advantageous relationship, at
least for the purposes of this Comment, are similar to those of interference with contract.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B special note 2 (1977).
136. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
137. Butz, 349 F. Supp. at 936 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
138. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 n.l 1 (1985); see also NAACP v. Clai-
borne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 911-915 (1982).
139. Butz, 349 F. Supp. at 936.
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to receive greater protection from common law liability, and it relied on
the antitrust cases to find an appropriate test. Such an approach might also
be followed in seeking out a test for liability for the tortious interference
with a contract where the freedom of the press, as opposed to the right to
petition, is implicated.
The Butz court noted that in Noerr the Supreme Court had disallowed
application of the Sherman Act "to a conspiracy of railroads formed to
foster the passage and enforcement of laws destructive of the trucking
business. The Supreme Court then carved out a "sham" exception
which the district court adopted and applied to the tortious interference
claim before it. In the Butz court's words: "[L]iability can be imposed for
activities ostensibly consisting of petitioning the government for redress of
grievances only if the petitioning is a 'sham,' and the real purpose is not to
obtain governmental action, but to otherwise injure the plaintiff. 1 4'
V. APPLICATION OF SIERRA CLUB V. BUTZTO WIGAND CASES
The extension of this Noerr-Pennington doctrine to nonantitrust cases
has been criticized,14 but its application to Wigand cases seems appropri-
ate. In order to adequately protect the First Amendment interests at stake,
namely freedom of the press, implicated by the threat of tortious interfer-
ence claims, the courts should hold that there can be no liability for tor-
tious interference with contract where the purpose of inducing the third
party to breach his nondisclosure agreement is to gather information about
a public figure on matters of public concern and not merely to harm or
compete with the plaintiff. This standard of liability combines the benefits
of being highly protective of First Amendment activity while obviating the
need to look into the truth or falsity of the defendant's speech, which is not
an issue in tortious interference claims. At the same time, the legitimate
interests of plaintiffs such as Brown & Williamson in preventing valuable
trade secrets from being exposed to competitors receive protection under
this test.
First, this test reflects the distinction recognized by the Supreme
140. Id. at 937.
141. Id. at 939.
142. See, e.g., Robert A. Zauzmer, Note, The Misapplication of the Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine in Non-Antitrust Right To Petition Cases, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1243 (1984). The
criticism is far from universal, however. See, e.g., Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home,
Inc. v. Wells, 839 F.2d 155, 159-60 (3rd Cir. 1988) (applying Noerr-Pennington doctrine to
tortious interference claim outside of antitrust context and noting doctrine is supported by
the New York Times line of cases); Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Hollobow, 702 F.2d 643, 649-50
(7th Cir. 1983) (agreeing with and applying Butz rationale in rejecting a tortious interfer-
ence claim outside of antitrust context).
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Court between public and private plaintiffs. Corporate plaintiffs such as
Brown & Williamson will most likely be considered public figures for the
purposes of this test,' 44 as may some individual plaintiffs; but, purely pri-
vate individuals may still be able to bind others to confidentiality agree-
ments regarding purely private matters and expect an action for breach or
tortious interference to meet a less rigorous standard of liability.' Such a
less rigorous test for private plaintiffs seeking to keep confidential infor-
mation of purely private concern would parallel the less rigorous standard
that private plaintiffs are required to meet in order to be awarded punitive
damages in a libel suit over private information.)1
Second, protection is given only to those defendants seeking infor-
mation regarding a matter of public concern. If 60 Minutes had induced
Wigand into revealing information of no public importance, such as the
results of employee evaluations or confidential employee files, it may not
receive heightened protection under this standard. Similarly, this standard
would not be applied to a competitor's attempts to obtain trade secrets
from employers like Wigand. Though the Supreme Court rejected reliance
on this "matter of public concern" test for libel actions in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.,'47 there have since been repeated indications that the public's
interest in the information remains a factor in the courts' jurisprudence.'"
Lastly, if the plaintiff is a public figure and the information in dispute
is of public importance, the court must then look into the defendant's pur-
pose in inducing the third party, such as Wigand, to breach his nondisclo-
143. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 379 U.S. 254, 272-74 (1964); Curtis
Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147-48, 155 n.19 (1967); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greennoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 756-57 (1985).
144. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 713 F.2d 262, 273 (7th
Cir. 1983) ("[W]e observe in passing that if the purpose of the public figure-private person
dichotomy is to protect the privacy of individuals who do not seek publicity or engage in
activities that place them in the public eye, there seems no reason to classify a large corpo-
ration as a private person."); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 508 F. Supp. 1249 (D. Mass.
1981), rev'don other grounds, 692 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1982), aff'd, 466 U.S. 485, 100 S. Ct.
1949 (1984); Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 483-88 (Minn.
1985); see also supra note 58.
145. At least one author has suggested that such persons may also have an action for in-
vasion of privacy. Susan M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a Remedy
forInvasions of Privacy, 43 BuFF. L. REV. 1 (1995).
146. See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 763.
147. Gertz, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
148. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 763; Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 50 (1988); McGrane v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 1044, 1046
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("Courts are increasingly reluctant to enforce secrecy arrangements where
matters of substantial concern to the public--as distinct from trade secrets or other legiti-
mately confidential information--may be involved.").
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sure agreement. If the defendant's purpose was to exercise its First
Amendment right to freedom of the press or speech, rather than solely to
harm or compete with the plaintiff, then no liability can be imposed. A de-
fendant's exercise of First Amendment rights need not be broadly defined.
For example, if the party that induced Wigand to breach his contract had
been Philip Morris, motivated by a desire to obtain valuable trade secrets
in order to capture market share from Brown & Williamson (rather than
CBS motivated by a desire to inform the public on an issue of public con-
cern (e.g., public health)), Philip Morris' conduct would fall under the
"sham" exception and liability might be imposed.
The defendant need not act solely to inform the public in inducing the
breach to avoid the "sham" exception, but must be able to make out a le-
gitimate, credible claim to have done so in addition to any private interest
it may have had. Thus, the fact that CBS is a profit-seeking entity as well
as an agent of the press would be of relatively little importance. Philip
Morris might also make public the information it gains in an attempt to
claim that it was acting in the public interest, as well as its own. However,
given the relatively common interest of the tobacco companies in avoiding
public outrage about industry practices, Philip Morris is not likely to go
public with any such information even if it might gain from the tarnishing
of Brown & Williamson's reputation. Even if it did, courts and juries are
equipped to assess credibility and make findings of fact, and they routinely
are asked to determine an actor's intent in civil and criminal cases. Only
the most biased jury or court would find that CBS had no legitimate First
Amendment interest but that Philip Morris did.
49
Moreover, the court's finding would not be based on a finding of
malice or ill will (as opposed to New York Times "actual malice").'0 In
Noerr, the Supreme Court acknowledged that one purpose of the railroads
in conspiring to seek legislation was that the legislation would be harmful
to the trucking industry, but found that the railroads sincerely sought leg-
islation and thus had a protected right to petition the government. 5' In
other words, the fact that railroads were motivated by ill will toward the
trucking industry in seeking the legislation did not diminish their right to
seek redress from the government. As the district court said in Butz, "It is
149. Indeed, the Butz court apparently saw the "sham" exception and the New York
Times actual malice test as requiring courts and juries to make essentially the same kind of
findings. Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934, 937 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
150. The Supreme Court has rejected common law "malice" as a basis of liability for
libel. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 n.18 (1971); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73, 78 (1964).
151. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139
(1961).
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for the purpose of personal gain or injury to those with opposing interests
that most citizens viii exercise their right to petition the government."
152
Similarly, even if CBS had been motivated by strong dislike for Brown &
Williamson, or even a desire to see harm come to the company after
broadcast of the Wigand interview, no liability could be imposed as long
as CBS had legitimately and credibly intended to inform the public on a
matter of public concern."
VI. CONCLUSION
First Amendment principles as applied to causes of action as libel,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and equitable or contract claims
brought under a theory of promissory estoppel demonstrate that public fig-
ure plaintiffs must meet a high standard of liability in order to punish the
press for the publication of information or speech relevant to issues of
public concern. In the context of tortious interference with contract, a
claim brought against defendants like CBS by public figure plaintiffs such
as Brown & Williamson on the grounds that the defendant, in the process
of gathering information on an issue of public concern, induced a third
party to breach a nondisclosure agreement with the plaintiff should meet
similarly stringent requirements. In Hustler, the Supreme Court applied the
actual malice standard of New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan but failed to ex-
plain how that standard should be applied when the truth or falsity of the
defendant's speech is not a necessary element of liability. Moreover, a
plaintiff in an action for tortious interference, such as that which CBS law-
yers feared, would not claim that the publication of the allegedly confi-
dential information by the defendant was the source of the defendant's li-
ability. Rather, the plaintiff would claim that the means by which the
defendant obtained the information-by inducing an employee to breach a
nondisclosure agreement-was the point at which the defendant's liability
arose. Therefore, though First Amendment principles establishing that
freedom of the press is to be diligently protected may be derived from Su-
preme Court precedent in libel and other contexts, those cases do not
enunciate a test that is easily applicable to such tortious interference
claims.
The primary concern is preserving the newsgathering function of the
152. Butz, 349 F. Supp. at 938.
153. Moreover, the fact that CBS would not directly profit from harm to Brown & Wil-
liamson, as Philip Morris likely would, should be a factor in applying the sham test. In
more general terms, as long as the defendant was not motivated solely by a desire to gain an
advantage in direct commercial competition or to otherwise harm the plaintiff, liability
should not be imposed for tortious interference.
Number 2]
512 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURATAL [Vol. 50
press while concurrently respecting the right and need of commercial
plaintiffs to prevent the disclosure of sensitive information to competitors.
A standard of liability drawn from the Noerr-Pennington line of cases and
clarified in Sierra Club v. Butz is a better test for these purposes than is
blind application of the New York Times actual malice standard. Such a
standard would require potential plaintiffs to show that the defendant's in-
tent in inducing sources like Wigand to breach their confidentiality agree-
ments was to harm or compete with the plaintiff, and not to gather infor-
mation about a public figure on an issue of public concern for publication.
This requirement would be highly protective of legitimate First Amend-
ment interests but is flexible enough to allow recovery for plaintiffs
harmed by a competitor uninterested in contributing to the public dis-
course. Moreover, this test would be no more difficult for juries and courts
to apply than the actual malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.
